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Abstract. A truthmaker solution to the Gettier problems is based on the idea that knowledge 
can be defined as justified true belief provided that the source of one’s justification is 
suitably connected with what makes the believed proposition true. Different developments 
of this basic intuition have been recently criticized on the basis of a series of arguments 
aiming at showing that no truthmaker theory can allow us to solve Gettier problems, since 
the very idea underlying such solution is ineffective. In this paper, I discuss the criticism to 
the truthmaker solution I consider most promising and show how it can be successfully 
addressed. 
Key-words: epistemology, knowledge analysis, knowledge definition, Gettier problem, 
justification, truthmaking. 
 
Riassunto: Una truthmaker solution dei problemi di Gettier è basata sull’idea intuitiva che è 
possibile definire il concetto di conoscenza come credenza corretta e fondata a patto che si 
richieda che la fonte della giustificazione sia connessa in modo opportuno con lo stato di 
cose che rende vera la proposizione creduta, e quindi corretta la credenza. Recentemente, i 
tentativi di soluzione che derivano da questa idea sono stati criticati sulla base di una serie di 
argomenti tesi a stabilire che nessuna soluzione di questo tipo può essere efficace. Il 
presente articolo intende analizzare questa critica e mostrare in che modo possa essere 
rigettata, argomentando a favore della soluzione ai problemi di Gettier che considero più 
promettente. 
Parole-chiave: epistemologia, analisi della conoscenza, definizione della conoscenza, 





A truthmaker solution to the Gettier problems is based on a straight 
intuition: knowledge can be defined as justified true belief provided that the 
source of one’s justification is suitably connected with what makes the 
believed proposition true. 
In the current literature, this idea has been differently articulated. A 
basic version of the truthmaker solution was originally proposed in 
(Jacquette 1996), where it was firstly acknowledged that the problem that 
arises in Gettier cases is that, in the definition of knowledge, the relation 
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that must obtain between the state of affairs that justifies belief in a 
proposition and that which makes the proposition true is not specified. 
Similarly, in (Heathcote 2006), it is noted that Gettier problems arise 
because, in the cases proposed, the state of affairs which is the truthmaker 
for the believed proposition is not identical to the state of affairs from 
which the evidence for the belief is drawn. The basic solution is further 
developed in (Heathcote 2013), where the notion of evidence of a state of 
affairs is analysed and the principle of the transmission of evidence through 
entailment is rejected, as one of the main cause of the problems. In 
particular, a distinction between evidence of a state of affairs and evidence 
for a proposition is introduced. The same solution is differently developed 
by Giordani (2013), in a wider framework, in which the distinction between 
explicit and implicit justification and the distinction between accessible and 
non-accessible states of affairs play the crucial role. A different account is 
proposed in (Bernecker 2011), where it is required that the truthmaker and 
the state of affairs we have evidence of co-varies across possible worlds. 
Finally, these various positions have been recently criticized by Vance 
(2014), who argues that no truthmaker theory can allow us to solve Gettier 
problems, since the very idea underlying such solution is ineffective. 
In this paper I discuss what I consider, along the lines of Vance (2014), 
the most promising criticism to the truthmaker solution and show how it 
can be addressed. The paper is divided as follows: in the rest of this section, 
the basic ways in which the Gettier problems arise are sketched; in section 
2, the common structure of the problems is highlighted; in section 3, a 
partial solution to the problems is proposed and Vance’s criticism is 
reported; finally, in the last section, a complete solution to the problems is 
advanced and defended against that criticism. 
 
Let <p> be a proposition.1 Let us assume, in accordance with the current 
interpretation of the classical analysis of knowledge, that we know that p 
precisely when (i) we believe that p, (ii) we are justified in believing that p, 
and (iii) p is true. Then, the Gettier problems arise. To be sure, two simple 
schemas for generating Gettier problems are available. 
 
Fake Object Schema. Suppose you are justified in believing that x, 
 
1 I use angle brackets to refer to the proposition expressed by a particular token 
of a sentence type. Since to know that it is raining coincides with knowing that the 
proposition that it is raining is true, I’m assuming that, in general, to know that p 
coincides with knowing that <p> is true. 
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which you know to be an object characterized by a certain set of traits S, 
should be in a certain region r, and x actually is in that region. You see an 
object, different from x but characterized by S, in r. So you form the belief 
that x is in r and this belief is justified by your seeing an object 
indistinguishable from x in r. Since x actually is in r, you are both justified 
in believing that x is in r and right in believing it. But, intuitively, you don’t 
know that x is in r. 
 
Example 1: Sara is a reliable person. She has agreed to meet you at the 
zoo at noon. At noon Sara is at the zoo and, when you arrive, you see 
someone who looks exactly like Sara, saying to you that she is Sara. You 
form the belief that Sara is at the zoo now. As it turns out, the person there 
is Sara’s twin sister, who you did not know existed. 
 
Fake Kind Schema. Suppose you are justified in believing that an 
object of kind K, which you know to be a kind characterized by a certain 
set of traits S, should be in a certain region r, and a K actually is in that 
region. You see an object, not of kind K but characterized by S, in r. So 
you form the belief that an object of kind K is in r and this belief is justified 
by your seeing an object of a kind that is indistinguishable from K be in r. 
Since an object of kind K actually is in r, you are both justified in believing 
that it is in r and right in believing it. But, intuitively, you don’t know that a 
K is in r. 
 
Example 2: Sara is a reliable person. She has agreed to show you a 
crocodile at the zoo. At noon a crocodile is at the zoo and, when you arrive, 
you see something that looks exactly like a crocodile, and Sara says that it 
is a crocodile. You form the belief that a crocodile is at the zoo now. As it 
turns out, what is there is an alligator, something you did not know existed. 
 
The conclusion we can draw from the cases generated according to 
these schemas is that, even if necessary, conditions (i) – (iii) are not 
sufficient to constitute an appropriate definition of the concept of 
knowledge. 
 
2. The structure of the Gettier Problems 
 
The truthmaker solution to the Gettier problems depends on a 
truthmaker analysis of the Gettier cases. Thus, before presenting the 
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truthmaker solution, let us analyse the structure of the Gettier cases. In 
particular, let us assume that any complete proposition<p>describes a state 
of affairs and that <p>is true if and only if that state of affairs obtains, so 
that to know that <p> is true amounts to knowing that the state of affairs 
represented by <p>obtains.2In this simplified version of the truthmaker 
theory, any true proposition is made true by some state of affairs, 
specifically by the state of affairs it represents. Now, Gettier cases are cases 
where we are justified in believing that a state of affairs t makes <p> true, 
even if<p>is true in virtue of a different state of affairs. In all such cases we 
acknowledge that there is a mismatch between the epistemic basis making 
the belief of an agent justified and the ontic basis making the believed 
proposition true. Intuitively, we do not know that p, because the state of 
affairs in virtue of which <p>is true is not the state of affairs related to the 
item in virtue of which we are justified in believing that p. We would say: 
“Well, of course the agent lacks knowledge: it is in virtue of an epistemic 
state j that she is assuming that <p> is true, whereas it is in virtue of a state 
of affairs that is completely unrelated to j that <p> is true”. Just to fix 
terminology, let us distinguish: 
 
(1) the justifier of <p>= that in virtue of which <p> is justified 
(2) the justmaker of <p> = the state of affairs related to the justifier of 
<p> 
(3) the truthmaker of <p> = the state of affairs in virtue of which <p> is 
true. 
 
We can then say that Gettier cases are cases where the truthmaker of 
<p>is completely unrelated to the justmaker of <p>.3 In all such cases, even 
 
2 This assumption can be generalized in many ways. In particular, the 
requirement of uniqueness of the state of affairs represented by a proposition can 
be dropped without consequences for the truthmaker solution. See [1] and [7] for 
general introductions to the truthmaker theory. 
3 A version of this diagnosis is proposed in (Heathcote 2006), p. 165: “In each 
case, then, we have disjoint states of affairs, one of which is the truthmaker for the 
statement, the other of which is the state of affairs which is the ground for the 
justification – this gives us the compass shape for these situations.” A more 
developed version diagnosis is given in (Giordani, 2013), p. 328 “Indeed, the 
problem arises because of the combination of four conditions: (1) we possess a 
justifier for the truth of a certain proposition; (2) such justifier consists in the 
evidence that a certain state of affairs is actual; (3) such state of affairs is not a 
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though we are justified in believing that p and <p>is true, we do not know 
that p. 
 
3. A partial solution to the Gettier Problems 
 
According to the previous analysis, the construction of the Gettier cases 
rests on the lack of relation between the truthmaker of <p>and the 
justmaker of <p>.Since this is the intuitive diagnosis, the intuitive solution 
is to introduce a condition according to which the state of affairs that makes 
<p> true is opportunely related to the justifier that makes the belief that 
<p> is true justified, i.e. to require that the truthmaker of <p>and the 
justmaker of <p>be connected. The problem now is to make this intuition 
precise. 
 
3.1. The Identity Account 
 
In (Heathcote 2006), an account of knowledge is proposed based on the 
idea that the state of affairs that makes a proposition true is the same as the 
state of affairs that the justification is grounded in (see Heathcote 2006, p. 
165). In particular, the following definition is stated. 
 
Identity Account (IA): x knows p if and only if 
(1) p is true 
(2) x believes p 
(3) x is justified in believing p 
(4) the evidence that x has which constitutes the justification is evidence 
of the very state of affairs that makes <p> true. 
 
To say that j is the evidence that constitutes the justification of <p> 
coincides with saying that j is the source of the justification of <p>. To say 
that t is the truthmaker of <p> coincides with saying that t is the source of 
the truth of <p>. Hence, to say that the evidence that constitutes the 
justification of <p> is evidence of the truth-maker of <p> coincides with 
saying that the source of the justification of <p> is at the same time 
evidence of the source of the truth of <p>.4 
 
truthmaker for that proposition; (4) we possess no justifier which consists in the 
evidence that the right state of affairs is actual”. 
4 As highlighted in (Heathcote 2013, p. 3), this account does not imply that the 
evidence for <p> is infallible. To be sure, a distinction between evidence for a 
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Let “[j]p” express the fact that justifier j is the source of the justification 
of <p> and “[t]p” express the fact that truthmaker t is the source of the truth 
of <p>. Then, IA can be stated as follow: x knows p if and only if [j]p ∧ 
[t]p ∧ j-is-of-t, where j is sufficient for believing p. IA allows us to avoid 
the problems deriving by the Gettier cases we have presented, since, in all 
such cases, the identity condition, i.e., j-is-of-t, is not satisfied. Indeed, 
instances of both the Fake Object Schema and the Fake Kind Schema are 
such that the state of affairs with which our justification is connected is 
disjointed from the state of affairs that makes the justified proposition true. 
 
3.2. Criticism of the Identity Account 
 
In his recent (2014), Vance analyses several truthmaker strategies and 
argues that all the proposed solutions fail. The general conclusion is that 
truthmaker strategies seem to be unable to solve the Gettier problems.5 In 
particular, with respect to IA, Vance argues that the solution does not work, 
because it is subjected to manifest counter-examples. The counter-
examples Vance has in mind are of the following type (see Vance 2014, p. 
4). 
 
Example 3: Sara is a reliable friend. This is generally acknowledged. 
You have asked her whether there is a crocodile at the zoo and she tells you 
that a crocodile is there. So, you form the belief that a crocodile is at the 
zoo, and indeed it is there. 
 
In a case like this we tend to admit that you have knowledge of the fact 
that a crocodile is at the zoo. Still, in this case, the state of affairs making 
the believed proposition true is the crocodile’s being at the zoo, while the 
state of affairs you have evidence of is Sara’s telling you so. Hence, the 
truthmaker and the justmaker are different, and so, according to the identity 
account, you do not have knowledge. IA, ruling out the possibility of 
knowledge based on reliable testimony, conflicts with our intuitions 
 
proposition and evidence of a state of affairs can be introduced in such a way that 
evidence of is factive, since it stems from the state of affairs it is evidence of, while 
evidence for is not factive, since it is consistent with many different, and indeed 
contrary, propositions. 
5 In (2014), Vance also takes into account causal and covariance emendations 
to IA. I agree with Vance that these emendations are not successful in providing an 
appropriate solution to the Gettier problems. 
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concerning knowledge from testimony, and so has to be rejected. The 
conclusion Vance draws is that the proposal we are considering “only 
delivers a satisfactory account of knowledge in cases of perceptual 
knowledge, and even then only if the direct realist theory of perception is 
true. Therefore, sadly, a complete solution to the Gettier problem must be a 
bit more complicated than this” (see Vance 2014, p. 4).6 
 
3.3. An ineffective amendment to the Identity Account 
 
Before going on, let us stress that the foregoing objection cannot be met 
by simply introducing a distinction between knowledge in a strict sense and 
knowledge by testimony. In order to see that, let us consider the following 
general schema. 
 
Reliable Information Schema: S is generally and justifiably 
acknowledged as a reliable source of information. You have asked S if <p> 
is true and S produces a report R(S) telling you that<p> is true. So, you 
form the belief that<p> is true, and indeed it is so. Let us note that 
 
(1) cases of reliable testimony are instances of RIS where 
 S = witness; R(S) = testimony. 
 
(2) cases of reliable recollection, also considered in [8], are instances of 
RIS where 
 S = memory; R(S) = recollection. 
 
But the most interesting instances of the schema are cases of reliable 
indication, where 
 S = instrument; R(S) = indication 
 
Example 4: You know that, typically, if a mercury thermometer 
indicates that the temperature of a box is 20 °C, then the temperature of the 
box is 20 °C. You come to know that the thermometer indicates that the 
temperature of the box is 20 °C. So, you form the belief that the 
temperature of the box is 20 °C, and indeed it is so. 
 
6 While IA seems to work well when the justification is perceptual, even in case 
of perceptual knowledge the success of IA turns out to be dependent on our theory 
of perception. In particular, it seems to be inappropriate if indirect realism is true 
(see Vance 2014, p. 4). 
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In a case like this we surely admit that you have knowledge of the fact 
in question, since all our empirical knowledge is ultimately based on 
information provided by instruments, and empirical knowledge is 
knowledge in a strict sense. Hence, there is no way to bypass Vance’s 
objection by introducing a concept of strict knowledge that bypass RIS. 
 
3.4. The Ultimate Identity Account 
 
According to IA, knowledge is based on the fact that the truthmaker of 
the justified proposition coincides with the justmaker of that very 
proposition, where the justmaker of a proposition is the state of affairs the 
justification of the proposition is grounded in. Still, in [4] a slightly 
different account is proposed, according to which the justmaker of a 
proposition is the state of affairs the chain of justifications of the 
proposition is grounded in. In particular, the following definition can be 
stated (see Vance 2014, p. 163). 
 
Ultimate Identity Account (UIA): x knows p if and only if 
(1) p is true 
(2) x believes p 
(3) x is justified in believing p 
(4) the evidence that x has which constitutes the justification is 
ultimately grounded in the very state of affairs that makes <p> true. 
 
This account is further discussed in (Heathcote, 2013), where the 
analysis of the concept of evidence is developed so to include cases of 
testimony. To be sure, in (Heathcote, 2013) the justmaker for a proposition 
<p> is construed as a part of the truthmaker of <p>: an evidential part of 
the whole. So, suppose Sara is seeing a crocodile at the zoo. Then, Sara’s 
seeing the crocodile is a part of a larger state of affairs including the 
presence of the crocodile at the zoo, and Sara’s telling you about the 
presence of the crocodile is part of an even larger state of affairs including 
the presence of the crocodile and Sara’s seeing (see Heathcote, 2013, p. 3). 
Therefore, Sara’s seeing the crocodile counts as evidence of the state of 
affairs that the crocodile is at the zoo and the same is true for Sara’s telling 
you about the presence of the crocodile. 
I don’t know if the account so sketched can work as a general solution 
of the Gettier problems, but this description is, as it stands, too generic and 
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incomplete to be satisfactory, and so an account of the sort of relation 
between truthmakers and justmakers that is conducive to knowledge is still 
missing. However, I don’t exclude the possibility of interpreting the 
ultimate identity account in the light of the solution proposed below. 
 
4. A complete solution to the Gettier Problems 
 
The general framework I want to use in order to solve the Gettier 
problems is the one proposed in (Giordani 2013).This framework includes 
a basic truthmaker theory and a theory of explicit and implicit justification. 
The basic truthmaker theory is characterized (1) by the possibility of 
composing states of affairs7 and (2) by a restricted version of the entailment 
thesis.8 Indeed, in order to cope with the problems generated by RIS, it is 
sufficient to exploit the core of the theory of explicit justification and the 
assumption that a truthmaker of <p> also makes true every proposition 
logically implied by <p>.The core of the theory of explicit justification is 
given by introducing an operation × of composition of justifiers and a set of 
specific justifiers for axiomatic propositions. The theory is then 
characterized by a schema of axiomsJ1 and a schematic rule RJ. 
 
J1: [i](ϕ→ψ) ∧ [j]ϕ→[i×j]ψ 
 
 
7 This move is standard in developing a theory of states of affairs. See, for 
instance, (Armstrong 2004, p. 18), (Heathcote 2013, section 2), and (Read 2000, 
section 2). 
8The entailment thesis states that what makes a proposition <p> true makes true 
every proposition entailed by <p>. This move is less standard. Some truthmaker 
theorists accept some version of the entailment thesis, see (Armstrong 2004, p. 18) 
and (Read 2000, section 2), while others prefer to reject it, since it seems to imply 
that every state of affairs is a truthmaker for every necessary truth. The version of 
the thesis I’m assuming only implies that every state of affairs is a truthmaker for 
every logically necessary truth. An argument in defence of this consequence is 
proposed in (Giordani 2013, section 4), where it is shown that it depends on the 
assumption of the existence of a unique truthmaker for every logically necessary 
truth plus the thesis, shared by most truthmaker theorists, that any proposition 
made true by a state of affairs t is made true by every states of affairs including t, 
see (Armstrong 2004, p. 18), and (Read 2000, section 2). Be it as it may, it is worth 
noting that the criticism I’m addressing is to the effect that any truthmaker theory 
is defective in solving the Gettier problems. Hence, what is needed is to show that 
at least one theory is successful in solving them. 
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J1 states that, given two justifiers, i and j, the composite justifier i×j 
provides justification to any proposition that can be deduced from 
implications justified by i and propositions justified by j by applying modus 
ponens. The idea is that the epistemic agent is able to use the rule of modus 
ponens and that propositional deduction is accepted as providing 
justification. 
 
RJ: if ϕ is an axiom, then [c]ϕ is derivable, for some c. 
 
RJ ensures that all the axioms can be justified, i.e. that the epistemic 
agent is able to use axioms as source of justification. In addition RJ, 
together withJ1, ensures that all the propositions that are derivable from a 
finite set of justified premises can be justified. To see that, suppose that ϕ is 
derivable from a finite set X of premises. Then, ϕ is derivable from the 
conjunction ∧X of the premises in X. Thus, the implication ∧X→ϕis 
derivable, and so, by RJ, there is a justifier c such that [c](∧X→ϕ). Since 
all the conjuncts in X are justified, the conjunction itself is justified, i.e. 
there is a justifier j such that [j]∧X. Hence, by J1, [c×j]ϕ. (see Giordani 
2013, section 4, for a detailed proof).That’s all we need. 
 
4.1.The Inferential Identity Account 
 
In (Giordani 2013), the basic intuition concerning the truthmaker 
solution is articulated as follows: if we know that a proposition <p> is true, 
then we have to be justified in assuming that <p>is made true by a state of 
affairs t such that (i) we have access to t and (ii)t is an actual truthmaker for 
<p>.Hence, x knows p if and only if[j](A(t) ∧ [t]p) ∧ [t]p, for some j and t, 
where A is an operator that checks if the epistemic agent has access to the 
state of affairs t. 
Let us say that we have evidence oft making true <p> just in case we 
have a justifier of the fact that we have access to t and t makes <p> true. 
Then, the basic intuition supports the following definition of knowledge. 
 
Inferential Identity Account (IIA):x knows p if and only if 
(1) p is true 
(2) x believes p 
(3) x is justified in believing p 
(4) the evidence that x has which constitutes the justification is evidence 
of a state of affairs that makes true a proposition from which the truth of 
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<p>follows. 
 
Indeed, we only have to show that, if we have evidence of a state of 
affairs that makes true a proposition <ϕ> and the truth of <p> is derivable 
from the truth of <ϕ>, then we have evidence of a state of affairs that 
makes true <p>. Suppose 
 
(i) [j](A(t) ∧ [t]ϕ) ∧ [t]ϕ 
(ii) p follows from ϕ. 
 
Then,[t]p follows from [t]ϕ, since any truthmaker for <ϕ> is also a 
truthmaker for <p>, and so A(t) ∧ [t]p follows from A(t) ∧ [t]ϕ. Since 
[j](A(t) ∧ [t]ϕ),we can conclude [j*](A(t) ∧ [t]p), for an appropriate j*,by 
RJ and J1. Thus 
 
(iii) [j*](A(t) ∧ [t]p) ∧ [t]p, for an appropriate j*. 
 
So, from the evidence of a state of affairs that makes true a proposition 
<ϕ> and the fact that p follows from ϕ, we obtain the evidence of a state of 
affairs that makes true the proposition <p> (See Giordani, 2013, end of 
section 5, for a detailed proof). 
 
Remark: IIA can be considered a version of UIA. However, the 
interpretation of UIA given in (Heathcote, 2013) is different from IIA. To 
be sure, the idea proposed in (Heathcote, 2013) is that of introducing a 
chain of states of affairs, ordered by a relation of being part, linking the 
state of affairs to which we have access to the state of affairs that makes the 
known proposition true. By contrast, the idea underlying IIA is that of 
introducing a chain of propositions, ordered by a relation of derivability, 
linking the known proposition to the proposition made true by the state of 
affairsthat we have access to. 
 
4.2.The solution to the cases of reliable indication 
 
In order to see why IIA allows us to get a solution to the cases proposed 
in section 3, let us move back to the case of our reliable thermometer. A 
thermometer is a measurement instrument and the core component of a 
measurement instrument is a device which typically operates by 
transducing the quantity being measured, qin, to an output quantity, qout. 
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This process is modelled by a function ƒQ: Qin→Qout, where Qin is a set of 
admissible input quantities and Qout is a set of admissible output quantities. 
Two points are worth noting. On the one hand, a transducer is designed in 
such a way that the output quantity that it produces is discernible, so that 
each output quantity can be mapped to a quantity value in a set Vout of 
output quantity values. This process is modelled by a function ƒout: 
Qout→Vout. On the other hand, a relation between output quantity values and 
values in a set Vin of input quantity values is given by inverting the 
fundamental operation of calibration. This process is modelled by a 









The measurement function m is then obtained by composing ƒQ, ƒout, 
ƒV.9This model highlights that we can assume that the information we get at 
the end of the measurement process is accurate only on the base of a 
number of assumptions. In particular, we have to assume that ƒQ is an 
appropriate model of the transducing process, that ƒout is an appropriate 
indication process, and that the instrument is correctly calibrated. If these 
assumption are justified, then we are also justified in believing that 
 
(1) if qin is the input quantity, then qout = ƒQ(qin) isthe output quantity 
(2) if qout is the output quantity, then vout = ƒout·ƒQ(qin) isthe output value 
(3) if vout is the output value, then vin = ƒV·ƒout·ƒQ(qin) isthe input value 
 
 
9 In our case, the input quantity is given by the temperature of the box and the 
output quantity is given by the length of the mercury column. The function ƒQ used 
to model the relation between Qin and Qout is typically a linear function. 
Furthermore, the output quantity value is given by the mark of the graduated scale 
of the thermometer and the function ƒout is defined by the correspondence between 
highest points of the mercury column and marks on the scale. Finally, the output 
quantity value, once a temperature scale is defined, is given by the number 
represented by the numeral associated to the mark of the graduated scale, and the 
function ƒV is defined by the correspondence between marks and numbers. 
Qin Qout 
Vin Vout fV 
fQ 
fout m 
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Finally, if (1) – (3) are justified, we are also justified in believing that 
 
(4) vin =m(qin) =ƒV(ƒout(ƒQ(qin))) is the temperature of the box. 
 
What we learn from this analysis is that, in a case of reliable indication, 
the truth and the justification of a proposition like (4) are based on the truth 
and the justification of (1) – (3).Hence, the knowledge of (4), being based 
on the knowledge of (1) – (3), actually is a case of inferential knowledge, 
perfectly consistent with IIA. Here, the conjunction of propositions (1) – 
(3) plays the role of <ϕ>, while (4) plays the role of <p>. 
 
4.3.The solution to the cases of reliable testimony 
 
A case of reliable testimony is wholly analogous to a case of reliable 
indication. The analogy rests on the possibility of interpreting a witness as 
something similar to an instrument. Let us consider the following 
assumptions: 
 
Assumption1: you are justified in believing that Sara told you that p. 
Assumption2: you are justified in believing that Sara’s report is 
reliable. 
 
These assumptions are either explicitly or implicitly stated in the story. 
To be sure, if you had reasons for suspecting that Sara’s testimony is 
unreliable, or that Sara is telling you something she has no knowledge of, 
or that you have misunderstood what Sara told you, you probably would 
suspend your belief. But from the previous premises the following 
inference can be drawn (where (1) follows from the definition of reliable 
report): 
 
(1) you know that, if Sara’s report is reliable, then its content is true 
(2) you are justified in believing that Sara’s report is reliable 
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
(3) you are justified in believing that the content of the report is true 
(4) you are justified in believing that the content of the report is <p> 
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
(5) you are justified in believing that <p> is true 
 
Hence, instances of reliable testimony are cases of inferential 
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The objection by Vance against the IA version of the truthmaker 
solution to the Gettier problems is based on intuitive counter-examples to 
it. These examples are cases of a general schema, the Reliable Information 
Schema, and cannot be avoided by contrasting a concept of strict 
knowledge with a concept of knowledge by testimony. Still, the account 
proposed in (Giordani 2013) allows us to introduce a version of the 
truthmaker solution, IIA, that is immune to the instances of the Reliable 
Information Schema. Since IIA is also able to provide a solution to the 
Gettier problems, it seems that the intuition underlying the truthmaker 
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